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I INTRODUCTION 
Any demands made on the material resources of this earth inevitably cause 
pollution. Pollution is the unfavourable alteration of our surroundings, 
. 1 
wholly or largely as a bi-product of human actions. Fortunately, if 
the environment is not overloaded with persistent pollutants, it is, 
in time, self-cleansing and capable of complete recovery. However, as our 
population and demands grow we have an increasing moral obligation to avoid 
polluting the environment unnecessarily and to recognise our neighbours' 
rights for access to a safe and clean environment. Public opinion has 
shown an increasing awareness of the need to control pollution on grounds 
of health, of social and economic welfare, and simply for the sake of a 
clean environment. As a result considerable progress has been made in 
New Zealand towards effective control of pollution. We have much legislation 
which provides for control of levels of pollutants in the air, water and 
. 2 
soil. 
However, although the quality of the New Zealand environment is good when 
compared with other countries, with the encouragement of industrial investment 
in this country pollution problems could increase dramatically despite 
the present legislative controls on pollution. There are problems already. 
For example, in the area of water treatment, the installation of new 
developments is not keeping pace with the increase in the amount of waste 
waters and in the degree of pollutant. Every New Zealand river upon which 
3 
a town or city is situated has a pollution problem of some degree. 
The principle source of pollution is industrial waste. Industries can be 
reluctant to treat their wastes because of the generally high capital and 
operating costs of doing so. Therefore, it is essential that tight control 
be kept on pollutants in the environment and imperative that polluters be 
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made answerable for their actions . 
We have to force developers to recognise that they do not have the 
right to take free goods and services like air and water , use them4 then discharge them back into the environment in a polluted state . 
The purpose of this paper is to examine New Zealand ' s present approach 
to pollution control . The focus, using the water and soil legislation as 
an illustration, is on the prosecution process and the inadequacy of this 
process as a means of forcing the polluter to be answerable for his or her 
actions . The lack of resources and lax attitude of enforcement agencies, 
the standing requirements which an individual must meet in order to bring 
an action , and problems in obtaining evidence and proving an offence lead 
to a lack of prosecutions and render the present system often ineffective 
and therefore undesirable . 
II PROBLEMS WITHIN THE PRESENT APPROACH 
A Diversity of Legislation 
Regulation of pollution has a very long history . Early cases of torts 
may be found in the history of English law . For example, in William Aldred's 
5 
Case a landowner recovered damages from a neighbour who had intentionally 
placed a pig-sty upwind from the plaintiff ' s property . But in recent times 
there has been a marked tendency to bring together in a coherent fashion 
the many diverse parts of the law which deal with the use of natural resources 
and human race ' s relationship to the physical environment . 
Pollution control is a complex matter. We are all polluters as well as 
sufferers from pollution and there is a government department covering every 
field of human endeavour . Therefore, it is not surprising that the list 
of legislation is long and dispersed among many government departments . 
(New Zealand has passed at least sixty - five pieces of legislation dealing 
• 
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with pollution of one form or another. See Appendix A.) 
Although it is reasonable that most departments administer some legislation 
dealing with the control of pollution, the diversity of legislation and 
of controlling bodies in itself creates a basic enforcement problem. In 
New Zealand, there is no legal connection between each of the various 
organisations with respect to pollution control . There is a need for some 
co-ordination of these controlling bodies. The reduction of one form of 
pollution not infrequently leads to an increase in another. For example, 
substantial pollution of a river has resulted from the imposition of 
requirements for reducing air pollution from a solid smokeless fuel plant. 
The resultant effluent was run off into the river .
6 
Another reason co-
ordination is needed is that although there may be an acceptable level 
of pollutant in each individual area, "an individually acceptable amount 
of water pollution, added to a tolerable amount of air pollution and combined 
with a variable amount of noise and congestion can produce a totally 
. 7 unacceptable health environment ." 
Co- ordination would be desirable where consideration is given to the location 
for a proposed industry . At present an industry must make applications 
for approval and operating licenses to the Town Planning Authority, Health 
Department ' s section for air pollution control and Regional Water Boards . 
With no co-ordinated decision-making an industry could obtain approval 
from Town Planning to set up on a site totally undesirable in respect 
to air quality,for example . Some co-ordination is needed to prevent such 
an occurrence so that before Town Planning approval is granted there has 
been consultation with other agencies on the desirability of a particular 
factory in a particular location. 
• 
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The proposed Ministry for the Environment will attempt some co-ordination 
. 8 
in the administration of the environment. However it will and should 
play the role of an overseer under which the various agencies would remain 
9 
relatively autonomous. When concerned with day to day administration of 
particular provisions, such as those in the Water and Soil legislation, 
specific expertise is required. There are licensing and control provisions 
which require a particular expertise and knowledge of industrial processes 
and pollutions control measures. This is not the role for an overview auth-
ority such as the Ministry for the Environment . The Ministry should only 
interfere in day to day administration if it believes provisions of some 
enactment are not being properly administered,or if there appears to be 
lax conditions in a particular area it could advise the appropriate body 
concerned. By remaining out of day to day administration the Ministry 
could give this sort of advice or persuasion. If it became involved directly 
the Ministry would lose that ability to view the whole scene objectively . 
B The Enforcement Agencies 
To be effective the present legislation requires strict enforcement, but 
there are problems with the enforcement agencies. D.A.R! Williams is one 
of those who are critical of the ''regulatory efforts of administrative 
organisations and quazi-judical bodies in the environmental field." 
10 
According to Williams their performance has been 
... Uneven and often unimpressive. Charged with administration, 
interpretation, and enforcement of environmental law, the organisations 
are often forced to operate with insufficient sanctions and grossly 
inadequate resources. In many cases , they lack sufficient expertise 
for prompt analysis of complex and highly technical issues. Often 
indifference, misinformation, or lack of adequate preparation leads 
to an embarrassingly poor response to matters of serious public concern. 
In some cases there appears to be a tendency for administrative agencies 
to become unduly influenced by the various interests they were 
intended to regulate. 
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Much of Williams ' criticism is valid . The situation has improved since the 
statement was made in 1980 but there are still major problems. 
The Water and Soil legislation needs qualified people to clasify the 
11 
waters initially and police and administer the classifications imposed. 
The enforcement of effluent standards depends on the attitudes and 
vigilance of these regulatory bodies. Regional Water Boards (RWB 's) are 
charged with this enforcement. But as Williams points out these are 
problems with such agencies . 
The Water and Soil legislation was enacted in 1967. The enforcement of 
the Act requires knowledge of the compositions of effluent , and therefore 
effluent monitoring is required. 
12 
But a study of RWB ' s nearly ten years 
after enactment of the legislation showed only one water board in the North 
Island claimed to have a full inventory of actual discharges . 
The majority of RWB's questioned had not processed discharge applications 
since 1968 and generally they felt that those which had been processed 
were only a small percentage of total discharges . Furthermore, very few 
applications for discharge rights were rejected, and only half the boards 
questioned did regular checks of effluents . Finally , the average number 
of employers of RWBs was three , plus some part time assistance . The whole 
of the North Island was dependent on forty people for frontline management 
of which only half were involved in policing pollution . Therefore Williams 
was correct in his assessment of "grossly inadequate resources ," Only 
now, nearly twenty years after the enactment of the legislation , is the 
Water and Soil Division implementing a national monitoring system which 
will sample streams and locations on a regular basis . This will give an 
indication of base levels of pollutants a nd water quality on a continuing 
basis. However this too is limited through lack of resources. Lack of 
money limits the number of sites that can be monitored on a regular basis 
-0 
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so initially monitoring will be limited to major rivers and lakes. 
The manpower shortage has improved. According to the Water and Soil 
Division few boards are struggling to get appropriate staff . Williams 
suggested part of the problem was a lack of sufficient expertise . However , 
this could have been avoided. The RWB ' s began from a "nil base" when they 
started operation. It takes time to build up experience and expertise , 
but over the last ten years this experience has developed to a point where 
those water resources officers have the necessary "expertise for prompt 
analysis of complex and highly technical issues ." Consequently they have 
the ability to construct a good case should prosecution result . 
Howeve~ despite the growth in experience and expertise of those involved 
in frontline policing of pollution, many polluters are not prosecuted . 
This is because the decision to prosecute rests with those who could possibly 
be the people whom the legislation was intended to regulate , The right 
13 
to use water is vested in the Crown . The Minister of Works is responsible 
for natural water but RWBs are delegated the responsibility of looking 
14 
after particular regions. RWB ' s consist of local authority personnel . 
For example the Wellington Regional Water Board consists of nineteen persons 
. 15 appointed from the councils making up the region . Four persons are 
appointed by the Wellington City Council , two by the Lower Hutt City Council 
and one each from the Porirua , Upper Hutt , Petone, Tawa , Eastbourne , Hutt 
and Horowhenua County Councils . Members from these bodies may also be 
appointed to drainage boards. Therefore there is a possibility of a RWB 
member also sitting on the local authority and drainage board . This 
situation inevitably creates conflict as some of the worst polluters are 
local authorities. Sewerage systems and drains into which industries 
discharge are controlled by local authorities and drainage boards. (Few 
industries have rights to discharge directly into natural water,) 
-0 
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Therefore the situation can arise where polluters are sitting in judgement 
of their own case . Members of local authorities would be reluctant to 
prosecute themselves , 
There can also be a reluctance to invoke the criminal law when it involves 
council members prosecuting their own ratepayers . This is especially so 
if the alleged offender has considerable economic "muscle" and provides 
jobs in the community . 
Therefore this system, which places the responsibility of prosecuting the 
polluter at a local body political level,can lead to a "tendency for 
administrative agencies to become unduly influenced by the various interests 
they were intended to regulate . " As a result their performance is often 
"uneven and unimpressive . " For example in Minister of Lands v Bay of 
16 
Plenty Regional Water Board the court noted that the respondent was content 
to allow breach of a discharge right which the respondent had itself imposed. 
In theory , agencies charged with the enforcement of environmental legislation, 
such as Regional Water Boards , are autonomous bodies. However, in practice 
they often suffer from conflict of interests of their constituent members . 
This is much to the frustration of their employees who are charged with 
the "frontline" policing of pollution; those who prepare cases for prose-
cutions which do not eventuate , This lack of enforcement by prosecution is 
also to the detriment of the environment they are there to protect . 
Possible improvements 
1 . Officials such as RWB officials should be obliged to investigate 
alleged offences and obliged to commence legal proceedings where 
a breach is discovered . Investigators who wilfully fail to perform 
-0 
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their legal duties should also be liable to penalties. 
This proposal would be too ext r eme . Some discretion is needed. 
For example , a prosecution followed by conviction would serve no 
purpose where there was an accidental discharge into natural water , 
where there was no alternative and all reasonable care was taken 
to prevent it. For example , there has been much debate as to whether 
the Rotorua District Council should be prosecuted because it breached 
water right conditions regarding Lake Rotorua . The lake is in a 
serious condition and there are demands on a national scene to clear 
it up. The Rotorua District Council is proceeding with major expend-
iture to treat its waste . The Council is doing all it can because 
the only long term solution is to remove the effluent from the Lake 
completely . It could never be made acceptable because it is such 
a small body of receiving water . The Council could be prosecuted , 
but all that would do is divert attention into the legal process 
and create animosity amongst the people who must work together to 
solve the problem. It would also add to the cost of what the Rotorua 
Council is doing . Prosecution would not stop people using their 
toilets and creating the effluent which is going into the lake . 
Generally prosecution should be brought when :-
(a) the industry concerned has no intention of complying with conditions 
of a granted water right or legislation; 
(b) the industry is in a downward cycle and cannot correct itself . 
There is a need to break that cycle . One way to break the cycle 
is to take that industry to Court ; 
(c) the re is a need for justice to be seen to be done , fo r public 
relations reasons. 
2 . The legislation could be e nfor ced by a government department. 
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The decision to prosecute would then rest with persons free from 
local influence and local body politicking such as that which occurs 
with RWBs. This is the method used to control air pollution. 
However, it would not be successful as a means of controlling water 
pollution. Water has a greater degree of 'rivalness ' than air, 
Water abstracted for irrigation or human consumption is water that 
cannot be used to turn a turbine or convey or disperse liquid waste. 
Similarly , the use of water as a means ofwaste disposal will prelude 
its use for human consumption, without costly treatment, Water admin-
istration requires a 'weighing up' of the needs of a particular 
community. For example the needs of industries which provide employment 
for the community must be weighed against the need for clean water. 
This requires co-operation and input from the representatives of 
the community, that is, local representatives. Therefore, to divorce 
water pollution control from the rest of water administration would 
create diffulties if different agencies were responsible for different 
aspects of that total resource. 
3 . Direct public representation: public concern brought about the 
enactment of environmental legislation, thus public participation 
should continue in its enforcement . Administering bodies could be 
elected by the public or at least have public representation. 
Possibly then common property resources would be likely to be awarded 
a higher relative valuation and that valuation will be enhanced when 
the public speak from a position of influence. 
This proposal would not necessarily change the situation. The potential 
for conflicts of interest would remain. Also, as with the previous 
proposal there would be the disadvantage of removing pollution control 
from the rest of water administration. Direct public participation 
-0 
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could ope n the way for lobbying by environmental groups , who are 
not necessarily the persons who should decide whether a prosecutio n 
should occur . Ther e would be a tendency to prosecute in all cases 
which , as has been argued , is not always desirable . 
4 . Although the ideal situation would be for RWBs to be excluded of 
local body persons , this would be unrealistic . However when it comes 
to pollution enforcement a member should declare his or her interest 
and abstain from voting . It is not desirable that a body should 
sit in judgement on its own water right application or pollution 
offences . So , for example, if the Drainage Board is the offender 
the representative from that body should abstain from voting on 
whether a prosecution is made or not . 
This procedure , coupled with an overseer role played by the linistry 
for the environment may be the most viable solution . The Ministry 
could intervene where the RWB ' s discretion was exercised injudiciously 
and perhaps order a reconsideration in cases where, for example, 
there has been a blatant offence, regardless of who the offender 
is . However , the power to intervene would have to be limited if 
the linistry was to avoid becoming involved in day to day administration. 
There would still be a problem where a particular member abstains 
from voting . Other members would still feel pressure not to prosecute 
a fellow member of the Board . 
-0 
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C Standing of the Individual 
Given the inadequacy or lack of action, at times,of the statutory 
enforcement agencies, there is a need for the individual or environmentally 
concerned organisation to take action. Where a specific type of damage 
to the environment is prescribed by a statute which provides for a criminal 
penalty for offences, private prosecutions may be brought by any member 
of the public by instituting a private prosecution. 
There are limitations on this course of action. The principal limitation 
is the question of'locus standi'- standing to sue. Generally, the individual 
must be affected by the activity in question.
17 
Thus, the litigant who 
does not have a specific interest, but endeavours to intervene on 'public 
interest' grounds, has not fared well in the Courts or at the hands of the 
legislature. 
The Courts have often adopted a restrictive approach to 'public interest' 
litigants. For example, in the 2, 4, 5 - T case Environmental Defence 
18 Society Inc. v Agricultural Chemicals Board the plaintiff tried to 
challenge the Board's restrictions of the use of 2, 4, 5 - Ton the grounds 
that they were insufficient to protect the public health and safety. 
Mr Justice Haslam held that the Society "can set up no breach towards itself 
19 nor any other grounds for justifying its standing" He thus found on the 
balance of authority that the plaintiff's lacked the requisite'locus 8 tandi'.
2
0 
However he did go on to look at English authority and said " ... strong intrinsic 
merits may let the Court take a more lenient view of the plaintiff's deficiency 
21 
in standing." Therefore, it seems that should the Court consider that 
the plaintiff has a strong case a more lenient view may be taken on standing. 
But generally this is a procedural hurdle to be overcome if an individual 
• 
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22 wishes to bring a private prosecution against the polluter. 
An individual without standing can also initiate an action by persuading 
the Attorney - General to bring an action. But the traditional view is 
that the Attorney - General has a complete discretion to bring or refrain 
from bringing an action. Indeed, the Attorney - General has the authority 
not only to take over but also stay a prosecution. 
The Environmental Defence Society did manage to overcome these hurdles 
in the case of Huntly Borough v Williams:
3 
The Society claimed that a 
number of its members used the Waikato River for recreational purposes 
and fishing. They claimed status to appeal on the grounds that individual 
members of the Society might be affected by the decision appealed against . 
The Board rejected this argument but nevertheless considered whether the 
Society 's members were affected, and decided they were not. However 
appelhnts who were affected adopted evidence and submissions from the 
Society . Thus the Society avoided procedural difficulties by getting its 
evidence heard, though put on behalf of another. Nevertheless the desired 
result was achieved. 
However, this is a limited solution and in many cases the requirements of 
standing will remain a difficulty for the public interest citizen to overcome . 
It has been argued that the requirements of standing be abandoned all 
24 
together. The proposal is that the sole screening mechanism for access 
to the Court would, firstly be the Court's discretionary power to award 
costs against an unsuccessful litigant, and secondly, the private litigation 
costs themselves. To achieve this legislation would have to be enacted 
allowing any person to sue if his or her interests or the interests of the 
public generally are affected by the challenged acts or omissions, 
LAW LIBRARY 
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There are merits in this proposal. Concerned individuals or groups would 
have an opportunity to challenge activity allegedly against the public 
interest. It may prompt the enforcement agencies into a more responsive 
and responsible attitude in enforcing the environmental statutory provisions. 
The Courts would no longer have to decide whether a litigant was entitled 
to participate in particular proceedings as this proposal would provide 
an automatic measure of sufficient interest to bring on action. That 
measure is the willingness of the litigant to bear the cost of his or her 
appearance in the litigation and to undertake the risk of an award of costs 
against him or her. 
However, despite these advantages two factors weigh against this proposal. 
The first disadvantage is the difficulty of gaining evidence in environmental 
cases. The result of this proposal could be a number of well-meaning but 
ill-founded cases taking the Court's valuable time. One factor against 
an individual bringing an action against a polluter is that the Court's 
ititial question may be to ask why the appropriate enforcement agency did 
not think it fit to bring on action. This leads to the major reason f o r 
maintaining the restrictions of standing of an individual. The resulting 
number of actions may undermine the purpose of the legislature giving a 
discretion to enforcement agencies as to whether or not to prosecute. 
As was discussed earlier, prosecution is not always the appropriate answer 
25 to an instance of pollution. To lessen the requirements to be met before 
an individual can bring on action is not necessarily for the good of the 
environment in the long term. Prosecution and conviction of the polluter 
may not always be the best solution to pollution problems. 
D 
1. 
Prosecution 
Burden of Proof 
The burden of proof rules have an inevitable bias against the protection 
. 26 of the environment. Those who exploit or plan to exploit a resource 
• 
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almost always appear as the defendant, while the environmentally concerned 
agency or individuals find themselves in the positions of the plaintiff. 
The burden of proof rules can be decisive in borderline cases where 
the facts are not entirely clear. In the environmental field the 
allocation of the burden of proof and the imposition of a certain 
standard of proof is frequently of even greater significance because 
human life, or an irreversible ecological change, may well depend 
upon what procedural framework is adopted .27 
Where an action is brought charging the defendant with the commission 
of a statutory offence relating to environmental damage the plaintiff 
is confronted at the outset by the doctrine of reasonable doubt. In 
addition the defendants merely have to demonstrate from the evidence 
the existence of facts sufficient to create a reasonable possibility 
that they may not be liable.
28 
Thus the concerned enforcing agent or 
citizen for the environment has to prove all the elements of the 
criminal offence . Traditionally this required proof of a mental element. 
However that requirement has been removed as a result of action taken by 
the legislature. Parliament was concerned that the requirement of 
proving the mental element was defeating prosecutions made under 
environmental provisions . Consequently, the mental element was removed 
from these offences along with the addition of defences that all reasonable 
29 care was taken to prevent the offence . 
Further progress was made when the New Zealand Court of Appeal drew a 
distinction between what it called "truly criminal" offences and "public 
welfare offences" , (that is, those offences aimed at the enforcement of 
public health and safety .) The Court held that for Public welfare offences, 
the doing of the prohibited act prima facie imports the offence, leaving 
it open to a defendant to avoid liability by proving that he or she took 
30 
all reasonable care. Section 34 of the'Water and Soil' Conservation 
Act was held to be a public welfare offence of strict liability in 1984 
in Hastings City Council v Simons
31 
following the earlier Court of Appeal 
decision. However, despite the removal of the intent requirement and the 
• 
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"public welfare" classification, gaining a successful prosecution remains 
difficult. 
Section 34 of the Water and Soil Conservation Act provides an illustration 
of the difficulty. For the purposes of a pollution prosecution section 
34 makes it an offence to discharge any waste or natural water containing 
waste into natural water. Establishing an offence has occurred and that 
it was committed by a particular defendant is not easy . 
Difficulties exist in obtaining the necessary evidence, particularly in 
the case of an illegal discharge under section 34. The difficulty is 
being ab le to specifically define th a t an offence t ook place on a certain 
date or dates and what actually happened, If someone advises the authorities 
that a discharge has gone into a creek because there are dead fish or some 
other evidence, it is usually some days after the event actually happened. 
Actual water quality might be back to normal values, so there is a 
problem of remoteness of time because most offences come to notice through 
public complaint . 
Another related difficulty is that of tracing the source of pollutant in 
order to identify the offender . There could even be more than one possible 
defendant . It may be difficult to prove one particular company is at fault 
when there may be multiple polluters of a river or stream. This difficulty 
is compounded because the definition of natural water excludes water in 
. 32 
pipes. Regional water boards only have jurisdiction over natural 
water . Thus , storm water systems and the like are excluded from the juris-
diction of RWBs . Very few industries have rights to discharge directly 
into natural water, most discharge into sewers or storm water systems, 
The RWB has difficulties tracing the polluter as it can only work with 
the end of the pipe. Of course the local authority would be in breach 
at the end of the pipe and one would expect them to co-operate in order 
• 
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to find the offender. However, this co-operation is not always forthcoming 
and when it isn't the local authority should be prosecuted, but that gives 
rise to the difficulty discussed earlier. Persons on the RWB are also 
members of local authorities and therefore prosecution is unlikely to 
33 
proceed, 
The establishment of regular monitoring will lessen the problems encountered 
in gaining evidence, particularly remoteness of time. But the situation 
would be improved if the definition of natural water was amended to exclude 
only water supply piplines but include storm water systems . This would 
give RWBs jurisdiction over storm water systems enabling speedier , and 
more accurate detection of polluters than at present. This is more desirable 
than having local authorities responsible as RWB officials have the equipment 
and expertise to carry out appropriate testing of water quality and so 
are better equipped to detect the polluter. However this would require 
greater resources for RWBs . Also to be effective it would need regular 
monitoring of all water courses to avoid the time lapse difficulty in 
obtaining the necessary evidence to prosecute. 
Therefore even with the removal of the requirement to prove intent and 
the Court of Appeal position where public welfare offences are involved, 
there are still major difficulties to be overcome before proving an alleged 
act beyond reasonable doubt. Statutory bodies and concerned individuals 
continue to have a substantial burden to overcome in order to succeed with 
a criminal prosecution. At one point in time such a burden was not 
intolerable. There was a common law preference favouring industrial expan-
sion and economic growth at the expense of natural resourse conservation, 
But today the situation is reversed and yet the burden rule remains. 
• 
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2. Penal ties 
Statutory penalties for pollution offences are substantial. For example, 
an illegal discharge of effluent into natural water can bring a maximum 
34 fine of $150,000. A fine of $10,000 per day may be imposed where the 
. . 35 offence is a continuing one. The Courts consider these fines an 
indication of the seriousness of such offences,consequently they impose 
fairly severe penalties on the convicted polluter. 
However, despite the magnitude of these penalties they are not unbearable 
for an industry when compared to the price of control equipment or the 
costs of revamping a particular process. Many of the daily fines imposed 
are less than what it would cost some large industries to maintain control 
equipment. Therefore the statutory penalties may not deter the potential 
polluter and therefore encourage him or her to find alternatives to polluting 
the environment . An alternative method is needed, one which would encourage 
industry to treat pollution rather than discharging it directly into the 
environment. 
III A NEW APPROACH TO POLLUTION CONTROL 
The attitude of industry is not necessarily one of selfishness. Selfish-
ness is not the root cause of pollution. In a market economy prices 
convey information about needs and priorities. At present there is no 
way for industry to know whether their use of the air or water is more 
important than other uses. Even if they strongly believe their use of 
the air or water for waste disposal is harmful, they have no incentive to 
respond to that belief. There is no price to convey this information to 
-0 
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industry and induce the correct behaviour. In short, one reason why the 
environment is abused is that people have not had to pay for it. 
36 
For example an industry may want to discharge effluent into a river. 
The water is a common property resource,therefore the industry has no 
individual property owner with whom to negotiate the rights of the 
discharge. Under the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 the industry 
is required to apply for a water right. If the right is granted the 
industry is free to discharge wastes into the river and has no incentive 
to control pollution. The costs of pollution are not borne by the industry 
but passed on to others downstream, to the victims of the polluted 
environment. The costs become "external" to the industry and therefore 
are not taken fully into account. 
An alternative is to use market mechanisms to persuade industry to 
"internalise" environmental costs, that is, provide the incentive for 
industry to reduce pollution by supplying the missing prices for the 
presently free resources. This would be consistent with the present 
government's desire to remove itself as much as possible f r om the 
allocation of resources and intervention and to leave the market to 
operate as the determinant of efficient resource allocation. 37 
Polluter Pays Principle 
Ideally, the way to induce the polluter to internalise environmental 
costs would be to price pollution equal to the costs caused by it. The 
amount of harm caused by each unit of pollution would have to be 
ascertained to establish the appropriate price. However there are two 
-0 
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fundamental difficulties with this approach. First, there is no 
"technically correct" method of establishing the harm done by given 
increments of pollution. The 'value' of the environment cannot be 
readily measured. Secondly, there is more than one source of pollutant. 
Individual units of pollution may have no significant effect on the 
environment but cumulatively they may cause damage. Thus, how can the 
38 relative pollution prices be allocated? 
The Ministry for the Environment Establishment Unit~introduces a Polluter 
Pays Principle. The suggestion is that property rights for discharge or 
emission of pollutants could be established and sold to industries 
wishing to discharge or emit pollutants into the water or air. There 
would be a limited number of rights but these could be traded. For example 
if an industry could reduce the limit of its discharge through treatment 
it could sell a portion of its discharge rights to another industry. 
(This method would require determination of the total acceptable limits 
of pollution that the environment could sustain. This is no easy task, 
but it is possible and is already done as basis for control under present 
legislation.) 
This method could be criticised as a licence to pollute or a means for 
the rich to pollute. However economic instruments linked to regulations 
could provide an incentive to polluters to reduce emissions and develop 
less polluting products and technologies. For example, taxation on 
pollution could be introduced.
39 
Effluent charges could be imposed on 
each unit of pollution released by industry into the air or water and 
each unit of those common property resources used by industry. This 
would provide industry with the incentive to reduce pollution, in order 
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to lower their tax burden. The industry would compare the cost of 
paying the effluent charge with the cost of cleaning up pollution to the 
point where the additional cost of removal was greater than the effluent 
charge. The effect of this would be that types of products whose 
manufacture required a lot of pollution would become more expensive and 
would carry higher prices than those that generated less pollution. 
Consumers would be induced to buy the latter. They would switch from 
those goods which increase the price, to other less polluting and there-
fore less costly substitutes. 
It may be argued that large manufacturers would simply pass on the 
effluent charge to their customers and not make the effort to clean up 
pollution. However effluent charges and taxes could be set high enough so 
that the cost of removing a substantial amount of pollution is less than 
the cost of paying the charges. Industries would reduce costs by 
reducing pollution just as they lower costs by reducing the amount of 
labour used per unit of output. Industries do not as a rule pass up 
opportunities to cut production costs. A substantial effluent charge 
will induce a reduction of pollution as it becomes a way for industry 
to cut costs. 
The current regulatory approach provides no incentive to reduce pollution 
beyond the required levels, in fact there is a positive incentive not to. 
Additonal reduction is costly and therefore lowers profit. With 
effluent charges and tradeable rights industries pay for every unit of 
pollution they have not removed. Thus there is a continuing incentive 
to devote research and engineering toward finding less costly ways of 
achieving still further reductions. 
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Therefore the polluter pays principle would 'internalise' environmental 
costs and represents a mechanism for bringing true market forces to bear 
in service of environmental goals. 
IV SUMMARY 
The major trend has been to involve environmental responsibilities in 
comprehensive statutory codes. In theory New Zealand has sufficient 
existing legislation for the control of all forms of pollution. We have 
statutes requlating the use and pollution of land, water and air. 
However, there are many problems with the current regulatory approach 
which has prosecution as a means of ensuring polluters are made to answer 
for their actions. Consequently the legislation is not being adequately 
enforced and therefore the desirable objectives of this legislation are 
not being achieved. The proposed changes outlined may improve the 
situation but they do not provide a complete remedy. A new approach is 
needed. 
If industries were made to pay for the resources they pollute they may 
seek means to control pollution. As Dr. Cullen emphasised; 
we have to force developers to recognise that they do not 
have the right to take free goods and services like air 
and water, use them, then discharge them back into the 
environment in a polluted state. 
The answer may be to make those 'free' resources 'unfree'. If pollution 
was to cost industry, then that may provide the incentive to reduce 
pollution. 
• 
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LEGISLATION CONCERNED WITH THE CONTROL OF POLLUTION 
AIR 
LAND 
Health Act 1956 
Air Pollution Regulations 1957 
Chemical Works Order 1960 
Smoke Restriction Regulations 1964 
Radioactive Substances Act 1949 
Radiation Protection Regulations 1951 
Town and Country Planning Act 1953 
Town and Country Planning Regulations 
Traffic Regulations 1956 
Clean Air Act 1972 
Noise Control Act 1982 
Municipal Corporations Act 1956 
Animals Act 1967 
Apiaries Act 1969 
Burial and Cremation Act 1964 
The Introduction of Plants Act 1927 
Litter, Act 1968 
Na tional Parks Act 1952 
Nox ious Weeds Act 1950 
Orchcrd and Garden Diseases Act 1928 
The Town and Country Planning Act 1953 
Agricultural Chemicals Act 1959 
1960 
The Asricultural Chemicals Regulations 1968/ 201 
Health Act 1956 
Pou I try Act 1968 
Reserves and Danains Act 1953 
Transport Act 1962 
Pol ice Offences Act 1927 
Mining Act 1926 
Qu~rries Act 1944 
Land Act 1948 
Nature Conservation Act 1962 
Petroleum Act 1937 
Noxious Animals Act 1956 
Forests Act 1949 
Forest Disease Control Regulations 1967 
Ti mbe r Preservation Regulations 1955 
Timber Floating Act 1954 
Hydatids Act 1968 
Stock Diseases Regulations 1937 
I-IAT ER 
Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 
Waters Pollution Act 1953 
Waters Pollution Regulations 1963 
Health Act 1956 
Wildlife Act 1953 
Fisheries Act 1908 
Harbours Act 1950 
Counties Act 1956 
Municipal Corporations Act 1954 
Mining Act 1926 
Underground Water Act 1953 
Oil in Navigable Waters Act 1965 
Whaling Industry Act 1935 
Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Act 1941 
Pol ice Offences Act 1923 
Petroleum Act 1937 
Animals Act 1967 
Crimes Act 1966 
Auckland Metropolitan Drainage Act 1960 and 
amendment Act 1963 
Christchurch · Drainage Act 1951 
Dunedin · Dlstrict Drainsge and · 5ewoge Act 1900 
1-: J t t Va 1 l e y Dr a i nag e Ac t 1 9 4 8 
North Shore Drainage Act 1963 
Continental Shelf Act 1964 
Stock Diseases Regulations 1937 
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Footnotes 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Definition of pollution adopted by the Working Party on Pollution of 
the Environment . See Physical Environment Conference 1970 : Reports, 
Papers and Proceedings p . 33. 
See for example Clean Air Act 1972, Noise Control Act 1982, 
Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 . 
Ann Bell Water Pollution and its Control in New Zealand: The case 
for new and positive legislation . (2ed . Botany Dept, Victoria 
University, Wellington, 1980). 
Hon . Dr Cullen , M. P .; N.Z . Parliamentary debates Vol . 450, 1983; 
378 . 
5 (1611) 9 Co. Rep . 57 , 77 E. R. 816. 
6 
7 
See on the problem of "the transferability of pollution" Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollution, Fifth Report: Air Pollution 
Control : An integrated Approach (1976; Cmnd 6371) paras 263 -
266 . 
Dr James Hanlon, an assistant Surgeon - General of the United States 
Public Health Service. Physical Environment Conference, op . cit. 
8 See cl. 28(c)(iii) Environmental Bill 1986 . 
9 See generally Preliminary Discussion Paper - Establishment of Parl-
iamentary Commissioner and Ministry for the Environment (1986) . 
10 D. A. R. Williams Environmental Law in New Zealand (led. Butterworths 
Wellington, 1980) p . 6 . 
11 Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967, s. 26C. 
12 J.W. Lello "Environmental Planning: The Case for Management" 
(1975) Master of Town Planning Thesis, University of Auckland . 
13 Supra, n.11 s.21(1) . 
14 Supra, n.11 s . 20. 
15 Wellington Regional Water Board Act 1972, s.6. 
16 (1984) 10 N. Z.T . P . A. 101. 
17 See for example Rogers v Special Town and Country Planning Board 
[1973] 1 N.Z . L. R. 529. 
18 [1973] 2 N.Z . L. R. 758 . 
19 Ibid . 765-766 
20 Idem . 
21 Idem . 
22 See generally Honourable Mr Justice Cooke "The Concept of Environmental 
Law - The New Zealand Law . An Overview . " [1975] N. Z. L.J . 631. 
25 
23 [1974] 1 N.Z.L.R. 689. 
24 
25 
26 
D.A.R. Williams "Law and the environment: A Symposium. Environmental 
Law - Some recurring issues "(1976) 3 Otago L.R. 372. 
Supra p.7. 
Krier "Environmental Litigation and the Burden of Proof" in Baldwin 
and Page (Eds) Law and the Environment (Walker and Co., New York, 
1970) p. 105. 
27 Williams, op.cit. 385. 
28 See generally Honourable Justice Mahon "Environmental Issues and 
the Judicial Process" [1976] N.Z.L.J. 507. 
29 For example Water and Soil Conservation Amendment Act 1983, s.15. 
removed the 'knowledge' requirement from the definition of an offence. 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
Civil Aviation Department v Mackenzie [1983]1 N.Z.L.R. 78. 
[1984] 2 N.Z.L.R. 502. 
Water and Soil Conservation Act, s.2. 
Supra. p.5. 
Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967, s.34(3)(b). 
Idem . 
Taken from Parliamentary Commissioner and Ministry for the 
Environment Establishment Unit Policy Paper 2: The Role of 
Planning in a Market-led Economy (July 1986). 
Idem. 
See discussion on emission fees, Stewart & Krier Environmental 
Law and Policy (2ed. Bobbs & Merrill, New York, 1978) p.569. 
Idem. 
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